New institutional economists have emphasized the significant role that institutional change plays in determining economic prosperity.
They have, however, paid little attention to the nuances that surround this transformation. As recent theoretical and empirical work has shown, the dynamics of institutional change are not as fluid as early research on the subject has suggested.' Distributional conflicts, transaction costs, and political intervention are crucial determinants of the path of institutional change and development.
The goal of this article is to provide a detailed, micro-level empirical investigation of the process of institutional change in one particular 1890. The traditional agricultural practice in Georgia was to allow animals to roam the countryside freely and to force farmers to erect fences around their crops. All unfenced land was considered common pasture that could be used by anyone. After the Civil War, however, there was a concerted effort to eradicate the open range policy and to enforce strict property rights to all land-fenced or unfenced, improved or unimproved.
According to estimates presented here, closing the range would have generated net benefits for many counties in the state, especially in areas with high shares of improved acreage. Most of these counties, however, maintained the status quo. While the aggregate net benefits were positive, I argue that the transaction costs of voluntarily resolving some related distributional conflicts were prohibitive. Empirical evidence shows that the Georgia legislature's role in facilitating the institutional change was crucial. The legislature allowed county and, later, subcounty referenda on the fence question which significantly reduced the bargaining power of those opposed to dispensing with the open range.
Most importantly, the legislature promised to enforce sidepayments between expected winners and losers if the new law were adopted at the local level. When compensation for a subset of the expected losers was guaranteed by the legislature, these voters responded as might be expected-they voted in favor of the new institution. For many Georgia counties that would have profited from closing the range, the government-endorsed sidepayment scheme proved necessary for the adoption of the institutional change that led to more rapid agricultural development in postbellum Georgia.
An important conclusion of the article is that traditional theories of institutional change tend to be overly optimistic. A close study of the Georgia fence problem reveals that net expected benefits are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the adoption of an alternative property rights arrangement. Distributional conflicts, coupled with high transaction costs, make voluntary change difficult. When the government is called in, almost any outcome is feasible. Although the focus here is narrow, it offers insights into the process of institutional change in a world in which trades are not effected costlessly. A study of the Georgia fence problem helps to unravel the mystery as to why some inefficient institutions persist, while others are pushed aside to make room for economic growth and development.
THE GEORGIA OPEN RANGE AND THE CALL FOR REFORM
Since colonial times Georgia planters were required to keep fences around their growing crops or else any "trespass or damage so ever he shall receive or sustain by hogs, cattle, or horses shall be his own loss "2 In fact, a 1759 law provided detailed specifications of what constituted a "lawful" fence.3 Instead of forcing livestock owners to control their animals, the fence law permitted citizens to allow their animals to roam the countryside freely. It should be noted that farmers were not legally compelled to put a fence around their fields. In order to sue for damages caused by a marauding animal, however, a legal fence had to be erected. If an animal happened to get into a farmer's enclosed field and destroyed a portion of the crop, the farmer's fence had to meet the specifications of the code; otherwise, he had no basis to sue the animal's owner for compensation. Moreover, if the farmer killed or maimed an animal straying onto his ill-fenced land, then the animal's owner could claim treble damages. In essence, the fence law created an open range, or a commons, whereby every citizen had the "right" to graze his animals on any land that was left unfenced.
In most areas of the colonial and antebellum South, farms were far apart, the land was heavily wooded, and population density was low. Whereas the open range seemed to have been an economical response to the demography and geography of colonial America, the late antebellum and postbellum eras brought a new attitude toward the profitability of fencing out animals and fencing in crops. "Excessive Fencing is peculiarly an American abuse, which urgently cries for reform," clamored Horace Greeley, who was certainly not alone in blasting the fence law as "needless and indefensible.' 4 Farmers, particularly those from the South, were told to ask themselves: "Are we an agricultural or stockraising people. . . ?"s As the editor of the Jackson County (Georgia) newspaper succinctly noted, "it is sad evidence of old fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness of agriculture in the South that such a law as that now in force can exist."6 Given the destruction caused by the Civil War, agricultural "progressives" argued that it was time for innovation. With confidence, reformers claimed that a "stock law," or the fencing in of animals instead of crops, would be the first step toward bringing southern farmers out of relative poverty and toward agricultural prosperity.7
What would cause people to seek a change in the open range policy that had been accepted practice for well over a century? Harold Demsetz, for example, has argued that "property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization."8 Similarly, Lance Davis and Douglass North have theorized that institutional change tends to come about when the net present value of a new regime of property rights exceeds that of the traditional set of rights.9 As an economy progresses through time, the costs and benefits of each feasible institutional arrangement continuously change, causing individuals and groups to constantly update their decisions concerning the appropriate arrangement for society. As late nineteenth-century farmers in the South witnessed the tangible and increasing loss of land, labor, and capital caused by the fence requirement, many began to argue that the traditional practice of allowing animals to forage freely was no longer compatible with maximum agricultural efficiency. When "the subject [was] . . . reduced to dollars and cents," fence reformers were convinced that agricultural prosperity-in fact, overall economic growth-depended on their inno-
The open range, reformers argued, was an anachronism. They acknowledged that allowing animals to roam at will was a tenable policy when farms were isolated and population density was low. But as economic and demographic changes were developing in the postbellum period, many believed that the traditional fence law had outlived its purpose. As population density rose, the probability that one person's roving animals would destroy another's crops increased. Certainly, a farmer could sue if an animal destroyed his crops, but he had to have evidence of the trespass and it was impossible for him to constantly watch his fields. Therefore, holding everything else constant, increased population density led to an increase in the relative costs of maintaining the open range policy and made fencing animals a more attractive option.
The doubling of the railroad network in postbellum Georgia also increased the relative benefits associated with fence reform. Since railroad right of ways were not required to be fenced under Georgia law trains often hit animals that wandered onto the tracks. The Georgia Supreme Court decided that as long as the railroad could show that it exercised "ordinary and reasonable diligence" in its attempt to avoid killing a wandering animal, then it could escape liability." Yet railroad companies did not escape the payment of damages completely. Samples from the annual reports of three companies suggest that railroads were forced to pay approximately $19.90 (in 1880 dollars) per track-mile for livestock killed because of the railroads' negligence.'2 According to these data, if the closed range policy had been instituted throughout Georgia in 1880, the railroad industry would have saved approximately one million dollars in damage payments. 13 This figure does not consider the dollar amount spent on repairing damage to trains that hit livestock, the monetary value of medical attention given to injured passengers, and lawyers' fees. In addition, it does not include the value of livestock killed in situations when the railroad was not deemed negligent.
The expansion of the railroad in the postbellum period increased the opportunity cost of maintaining the status quo in another way as well. When railroads arrived in areas previously without a connection, farmers were able to import relatively inexpensive fertilizers that raised cotton yields per acre. In addition, the railroad provided an efficient means for farmers to export their cotton surplus to major marketing centers. 14 In many areas of Georgia, the simultaneous expansion of the population and the railroad network created a new problem for farmers-how to use the available productive land more efficiently. With animals fenced in, advocates of reform predicted that improved acreage could be expanded.
Supporters of the closed range saw two sources of unimproved land that could be brought into cultivation-the wasted land used as fence rows and the patches of fertile ground too small to justify expenditure on a lawful fence. Nineteenth-century southern farmers, for the most part, enclosed their crops with "worm" fences which were constructed by laying the ends of the rails on top of one another in a zigzag fashion; would have been the total value of the produce minus the cost of feeding the previously nonpastured animals minus the cost of producing the crops. In order to make the calculations, I have assumed that the wasted acreage equaled the lower-bound estimate of 1.5 percent of the improved acreage and that farmers grew two types of crops on their 15 In a letter to the Southern Cultivator, 36 (Jan. 1878), p. 7, a "Subscriber" maintaine fence occupied a total distance of seven feet across. It should be noted that "Subscriber" was a pro-fence advocate. Washburn and Moen, The Fence Question, p. 16, whose ultimate goal was to advertise the benefits of using barbed wire, claimed that eight feet of land was wasted by the worm fence.
16 If worm fences spanned seven feet and crops were grown in perfectly square plots of land, with sides of length x feet, then the ratio of productive land wasted can be expressed as a function 1(x) = (28x -196)/x2. I use feet, instead of acres or hectares, for simplicity. Assuming square plots of land, it is easy to convert acres into the length in feet. One acre of land equals 43,560 square feet.
Therefore, given the acreage of a piece of land, the length of the sides (in feet) equals the square root of 43,560 times the number of acres. Data on tilled acreage per farm were obtained from aggregate county level data in U.S. Census Office, Report, pp. 109-11. Notes: Each asterisk represents a county that had adopted the stock law by 1882. A dagger indicates a county that had the stock law imposed by the state legislature.
Sources: See Table 1. counties in the state would have amounted to $8,007,500, or $69,474 per county. If we include the expected savings from negligence payments in the railroad industry, the total savings would have risen to more than nine million dollars.
It is important to note that the average expected savings for those counties that passed the stock law by 1882 was about $122,000 more than the state mean. This observation lends credence to the Davis and North hypothesis that institutional change tends to come about when the net present value of a new institutional arrangement exceeds that of the status quo. Net profitability, however, was not a sufficient condition for the adoption of the stock law. Table 2 shows the frequency distributions of expected net profits by region and identifies the counties that had adopted the law by 1882. In the Plantation Belt, only nine of 39 counties with an expected gain greater than $100,000 had implemented the stock law by 1882. In the Upcountry, 15 counties with a profit estimate greater than $100,000 did not adopt the stock law, while two others had adopted the law with an expected gain of less than $100,000. Why did these 15 counties, and those in the same position in the Mountain region, not adopt the relatively profitable law? Attributing the failure to transaction costs alone is much too simple, for there is no reason to believe that transaction costs were lower in the counties that adopted the stock law than in those that did not. Relative to the state as a whole, Carroll's profitability ranked in the seventh decile, while Jackson's ranked in the top of the ninth.
Analyzing why Carroll and Jackson counties failed to adopt the stock law by the early 1880s offers a rigorous test of the theory that institutional change tends to come about as the relative benefits become positive. Although the expected gains were high for these counties, they did not adopt the new institution right away because of distributional conflicts and transaction costs. These difficulties were overcome in these two Upcountry Georgia counties only when the political process facilitated the institutional change. The 1872 legislation was a major victory for stock law supporters in Georgia. Since the expected net benefits of the stock law were unevenly distributed across the state, fence reformers realized that a statewide 30 In Jackson County, 76 farmers classified as tenants reported no land, but positive level cotton and/or corn output and positive livestock holdings. In addition, 11 farmers enumerated as tenants reported no land, no cotton or grain production, and no livestock. The nonreporting of such data may be evidence supporting the argument in Virts, "Estimating the Importance," that the plantation system persisted into the postbellum period. Large plantation-type farms may have hired "tenants," but all of the decision making was conducted by the landowner. It might be conjectured that Jackson County tenants not reporting pertinent data may have been part of such a plantation system. In any case, I have reclassified the 11 tenants who reported no data as farm laborers. Given that I have the total agricultural output of the former 76 tenants, I have estimated their tilled acreage in each of the various crops based upon the average yields per acre of the other tenant farmers in Jackson County. Moreover, I have set their pasture allocations to zero, which will tend to bias my results against finding net benefits for these farmers. I found none of the problems discussed above in the Carroll County data. Table 3, however, suggest that this point is somewhat misleading. Farm size alone did not determine how a farmer would fare if the laws governing unfenced land were changed. Of Carroll's 438 landowners who hypothetically expected a net gain from the closed range policy, 178 had less than 35 acres under till. Similarly, of the 378 winning landowners in Jackson, 23 percent had less than 35 acres in production. Moreover, there were relatively large farms that stood to lose if the closed range were imposed. Of the 983 losing landowners in Carroll, 35 had more than 100 tilled acres. Of the 751 losing landowners in Jackson, 86 had more than 100 acres in production. The forces that determined a farmer's financial interest in the matter were more complicated than a simple "haves" versus "have nots" model would suggest.
Tenants as a class cannot be so easily placed in the fence law camp. Better tenants presumably received a higher remuneration for their services. The landowner rewarded the good tenant not only for his productivity, but also for his careful attention to the owner's land and/or livestock. One way to compensate a high-quality tenant may have been to provide him with pasture on the landowner's farm. Enclosing animals not only saved valuable time spent searching for animals in the forest, 31 Flynn, White Land, p. 145; and Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, pp. 248, 262. 32 In Carroll and Jackson counties, landowners expecting a net gain had an average of eigh nine acres of pasture, while expected losers had virtually none. Likewise, winning tenants in Carroll had a little more than an acre of pasture, while losers had about none. Winning tenants in Jackson were able to negotiate for about five acres of pasture space.
but it also corresponded to higher-quality meat and dairy products because the animals' food intake could be controlled. According to the manuscript schedules of the agricultural census, 40 tenants were able to secure pasture land in Carroll and 46 were able to do so in Jackson.
Although these tenants had pasture, they still had the option to let some of their animals roam the countryside. According to contemporary evidence and the manuscript data, however, the tenants who received pasture were given enough to enclose all of their livestock.33
Pasture was an item that the tenant had to negotiate with the landowner. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C. M.
Wood, a landlord from Harmony Grove in Jackson County, the subject of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was also stated that "there is to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation [sic] . "34 If the rental contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage, and provided no formal pasture or unimproved land for animals to forage, a tenant then had four options: he could keep no animals, as 6.1 percent of Carroll and Jackson tenants decided; he could pen his animals and feed them purchased grain or fodder grown on his small farm; he could rent a plot of pasture; or he could send his livestock out into the forest to find food for themselves.35 Presumably, most poor tenants chose the latter. Would they all have been hurt by the stock law? Table 3 suggests that not all tenants would have been hurt by the stock law, and many benefited even though they had no pasture. Because so many tenants had few animals, especially in Carroll County, the benefits associated with expanding acreage and eliminating large-scale fence maintenance would have exceeded the costs of enclosing and feeding them. In total, about 47 percent of the tenants in Carroll and 30 percent in Jackson stood to gain from fencing animals in, instead of fencing them out.
For those tenants expecting a loss from the stock law, the financial injury would have been somewhat tempered by the competitive market 38 See, for example, Georgia, Session Laws, 1871, No. 209, p. 109, and No. 190, p. 128. 39 Carroll Free Press, Mar. 26, 1886. legislation. The town coalition, however, was quite small, amounting to only 381 in Carroll and 206 in Jackson.
The data in Table 3 Because landowners and laborers were periodically bargaining with one another to determine the rent or wage, contracts could have included a contingency clause providing the tenant or laborer with an appropriately sized sidepayment to compensate for any expected loss.
It is unlikely, however, that this type of negotiated settlement would have been implemented. First, it is doubtful that many laborers would have believed that their employers would have actually compensated them once the ballots were cast and the election was over. Second, there would have been a problem of free riding if there were no mechanism forcing landowners to pay their share of the sidepayments. It is not surprising then that many counties that could have profited from the stock law failed to achieve the change. As long as the median voter was against change and sidepayments could not be effected, the status quo, no matter how socially inefficient, would persevere.
There were two obvious solutions to this problem-either voters who had the most to lose by the institutional change could have been disfranchised, thereby shifting the median voter toward being a net winner, or a formal mechanism could have been created that would have eliminated free riding and put the force of the law behind a compensation scheme. Although stock law supporters called for the explicit disfranchising of voters they thought were blocking reform-landless tenants and laborers-the legislature never imposed eligibility requirements on fence elections1 Instead, maintaining its commitment to direct local democracy, the Georgia General Assembly created an advantage for the reform movement by manipulating the rules governing fence elections. In 1881 the legislature removed the restriction limiting counties to only biennial votes on the fence issue. Under the new law, the ordinary could call for an election at any time: setting the election date during harvest season, for example, when most small farmers, tenants, and laborers were busy with their work.42 In addition, a county could now hold elections again and again, inevitably dampening turnout, which reduced the number of votes that stock law advocates had to win. This advantage only lasted for two years though, when in 1883 the legislature restricted a county's vote to once per year, the first Wednesday in July.43
The most significant legislative change in 1881 permitted referenda on the fence issue at the subcounty militia district level. Although similar in spirit to the 1872 law, the wording of the ballots was changed for the district elections. Instead of voting for "no fence" (stock law) or "fence" (status quo) as it was in a countywide referendum, the district election required the ballots to read either "stock law" or "for fence."
Although this may appear to be a subtle nuance, it was not. The significance of this rewording will be discussed below. Once passed, the stock law went into effect six months after the election, and the district had to erect "good and substantial" fences around its circumference in order to prevent strays from other places from entering the closed range area. This requirement initially made the cost of adopting the stock law quite high, but it was struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court in
1885.44
The remarkable feature of the 1881 legislature was that it required the owners or proprietors of land in militia districts that adopted the stock law to provide pasturage for at least one cow and calf for the family of each tenant who did his proportionate share of the fencing of the pasture. This pasture requirement, which did not pertain to countywide elections, acted as a contingency contract, promising to at least partially compensate tenants for their losses after the stock law was adopted. According to contemporary estimates, a cow and a calf could have been pastured on one acre of land. I recomputed the profitability estimates to take account of this clause. If a tenant already had pasture before the institutional change, his estimate would remain the same. For tenants who reported no pasture in the 1880 census, I added one acre of pasture to their data and reran the calculation, leaving everything else constant.
For Carroll County, whereas 47.4 percent of the tenants expected a non-negative net benefit from the stock law with no pasture allowance, 42 Georgia, Session Laws, 1881 , No. 110, pp. 60-61. 43 Georgia, Session Laws, 1883 " The law allowing militia district option is in Georgia, Session Laws, 1881, No. 401, pp. 79-81. In Jones v. Sligh the court declared that it was unconstitutional for the county ordinary to levy and to collect a tax upon the property of a militia district in order to build and to maintain a fence around a district that voted for the stock law. This virtually meant that the fence requirement was invalidated. Then in Dover v. The State of Georgia the court was more direct. It ruled that the stock law would still go into effect in a militia district that voted for the law even though it did not have a fence surrounding its borders. See also Holleman v. Kingery. 80.0 percent would have benefited if the landowner were required to provide an acre of pasture. For Jackson County, the results show the same steep trend, rising from 27.6 percent if no pasture were provided to 71.4 percent with a pasture allotment.45 The 1881 law allowing district referenda on the fence problem, in effect, made compensation of tenants by landowners a reality, and eliminated the free-rider problem by requiring all landowners to make the transfer payment. Carroll and Jackson counties were able to overcome the distributional conflicts that impeded fence reform through the district referenda process. By 1890 all but a small area of Carroll County had closed its range and in Jackson County six of thirteen militia districts chose the stock law.
AN EMPIRICAL LOOK
The hypothesis advanced in the previous section is that Georgia counties that expected a positive benefit from the stock law were unable to adopt it because the rules governing choice made the cooperative solution, which depended on transfer payments, virtually impossible to achieve. In other words, there was no mechanism to reduce the transactions costs associated with voluntarily bargaining to adopt the more profitable institution. In most cases, the 1872 law did not lead to the implementation of the closed range where it was profitable. The 1881 legislation, by allowing for militia district referenda, changed the rules of the game and created an opportunity for a coalition among landowners, tenants, and townspeople to adopt the new institution. This section tests empirically whether the legislature's manipulation of the voting mechanism influenced the outcome.
After three frustrating defeats at the countywide level in Carroll and two in Jackson, stock law supporters began to concentrate their attention on adopting the law at the militia district level. By 1890, 14 of the 16 districts in Carroll had adopted the stock law in district referenda. In five of these 14 districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared the victor, but after being contested on the ground of ballot fraud, the county ordinary overturned the results and declared the districts stock-law areas. The precise wording of the law, no doubt, created confusion among voters as the county election ballots were required to read either "fence" or "no fence," the latter meaning the stock law. As stated previously, however, the district election ballots had to be either "for fence" or for the "stock law." The election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly muddled as the precinct 4 An alternative way to interpret the pasture law is to suppose that the landowner would give the tenant an acre of pasture, but, at the same time, would reduce the tenant's tilled acreage by an acre. the baseline probability (all variables set at their means).
b To determine the marginal effects that laborers had on the vote, I reran an equation using laborers instead of townspeople and determined the laborers' marginal effect from that equation. In other words, when running the equations, one of the independent variables had to be excluded because they all sum to 100.
c This is the estimated probability of voting for the stock law in a countywide election, setting all of the independent variables at their means. The next row reports the predicted probability assuming a district election, governed by the 1881 rules.
d Significant at the less than or equal to 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
e Significant at the less than or equal to 0.05 but greater than 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
f Significant at the less than or equal to 0.10 but greater than 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
Variables with asterisks indicate interaction between the individual terms.
Sources: Countywide voting returns were collected from the Carroll County Times, Jan. 13, 1882, and Sept. 15, 1882; Carroll Free Press, July 3, 1885 , July 8, 1887 , and July 4, 1890 and Jackson Herald, July 8, 1881, and Sept. 14, 1883 . District referenda returns were collected from the Carroll Free Press, Sept. 18, 1885 , Mar. 11, 1887 , Mar. 18, 1887 , Apr. 1, 1887 , June 24, 1887 , July 8, 1887 , Sept. 9, 1887 , Dec. 16, 1887 , and Feb. 22, 1889 and Jackson Herald, Oct. 23, 1885 , Apr. 23, 1886 , Sept. 2, 1887 , and Nov. 11, 1887 . Independent variables were computed using a 100 percent matched sample of the agricultural and population manuscript schedules of Carroll and Jackson counties.
the percentage of the electorate abstaining corresponded to a statistically significant increase (4.8) in the percent voting for the stock law.
Thus, the analysis refutes the view that poor landowners, tenants, and laborers were uniformly against the stock law policy. There was a group of tenants who united with their landowners and their town neighbors in an attempt to capture the efficiency gains associated with a closed range.
How did the changes in the fence election rules affect voting behav- The increased support for the stock law at the district level is difficult to precisely pin down. Surprisingly, winning tenants decreased their support for the closed range policy in district elections, lowering the stock law's probability of success by 0.032 (relative to a countywide election). This result is not statistically significant at conventional levels, however. The coalition of losing tenants increased the probability of adopting the stock law in a district election by 13.1 percentage points (again, relative to a countywide election). Yet, this estimate is not statistically significant either. The most statistically significant finding is the increase in support by laborers voting in district elections. They boosted the stock law's share of the ballots by an additional 12.4 percentage points over the countywide probability. One explanation for this result might be that many laborers anticipated a relatively quick move into tenancy, where they would be guaranteed pasture by law.49 An alternative hypothesis might be that the laborers' strong support was the result of vigorous canvassing by stock law supporters. Since the district election involved many fewer people and a smaller geographic region, it is possible that the transaction costs associated with compensating laborers were reduced enough to enable stock law supporters to create a winning coalition that included labor acquiescence as well (compensated, of course).
It is clear that the changed election rules enabled stock law supporters to enhance the size of their coalition just enough to carry the fence election at the district level. If a district in fact held an election, the estimation predicts that the stock law garnered 53.2 percent of the ballots cast-enough for victory. The 1881 district option law was truly successful in building a minimum winning coalition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Before the Georgia General Assembly began to legislate on the fence question, transaction costs made a voluntary, large-scale closing of the range virtually impossible. A voluntary solution required the unanimous consent of all animal owners to enclose their livestock. A single person could hold up reform. Under the 1872 law allowing majority rule at the county level, however, it took more than half of the votes cast in an election to maintain the status quo. With the median voter against reform, sidepayments were necessary to compensate losers (at least a coalition of them) for their expected losses if access to the open range were cut off. But again, transaction costs associated with overcoming free riding among the beneficiaries and the actual process of paying bribes most likely made the 1872 law ineffective. Finally, the legislature redesigned the rules of fence elections in 1881. The 1881 pasture requirement apparently was designed to compensate at least some of the expected losers. More importantly, the law forced all landlords to pay the bribe-free riding was no longer a feasible strategy.
The 1881 law did more than provide a mechanism to overcome the compensation and free rider problems; it created an opportunity for fence reformers to use chicanery in their attempt to close the range. In five instances the Carroll County ordinary threw out invalid votes for the fence law, leaving a majority for the new institution. It is interesting to note that three of the five districts expected net social losses if the stock law were imposed. Net benefits, therefore, are neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for institutional change to take place. The mechanism that governs choice can be manipulated in such a way that allows a subset of the population to profit at the expense of society as a whole.
While Carroll and Jackson counties expected to gain much from the stock law, their relative delay in adopting the law illustrates the sometimes difficult process of institutional change. The potential for efficiency gains did not guarantee the replacement of an old institutional arrangement by a new one. When distributional conflicts and transaction costs hinder the adoption of a relatively profitable institutional arrangement, what type of mechanisms are likely to emerge in order to resolve the impasse? More attention needs to be paid to the precise arrangements that govern choice, for they will dictate whether "the more efficient institution . . . will survive and the inefficient ones perish. 50 50 North, Structure and Change, p. 7. 
